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Modeling Member Responses to the Farmer Owned 




Significant change is taking place in the agricultural industry.  These dynamics 
are creating both challenges and opportunities for agricultural cooperatives.  For 
example, the rapid consolidation among farm input and output companies reduces 
producers’ bargaining power, which strengthens the unique role for the farmer-owned 
cooperative as a counter-veiling power to a consolidating agribusiness industry.  Also, 
rapid technology improvements are changing the farming environment and creating new 
opportunities for cooperatives in providing farmers with access to these technologies.  
Specialty crops and development of new consumer markets create new opportunities but 
also require investments in special processing equipment and distribution channels. 
To take advantage of these opportunities the farmer-owned cooperative must have 
the financial flexibility to pursue new opportunities.  Financial flexibility results from the 
cooperative maintaining control of its financial structure.  Cooperatives, historically, have 
had trouble balancing financial stability while remaining competitive through cash 
patronage refunds and balancing user/owner relationships. 
In many instances, cooperatives use higher cash patronage refunds or favorable 
prices to entice producers to do business with the cooperative.  Higher cash patronage 
and lower margins may reduce equity sources that provide for stability and growth.  In 
other cases, cooperatives may retain large allocated earnings positions to invest 
aggressively in new business opportunities. The tradeoff, however, is that they pay low 
cash patronage refunds which may hurt the relationship with its members and effectively 
reduce members’ use of the cooperative.  If the cooperative places too much emphasis on 
current cash patronage refunds it constrains its ability grow.  However, if current cash 
patronage refunds are not maintained at a certain level the cooperative can lose business 
because producers may not perceive immediate benefits from patronizing the 
cooperative.  2 
The most universal cooperative principle is service at cost. This principle is 
achieved by distributing profits based on use.  It follows therefore, that ownership be 
based on use.  Thus, the only way to maintain a user/ownership balance is to retire equity 
of over-invested members and increase the equity of under-invested members.  Members, 
however, often do not recognize the value of profits allocated to them in the form of 
stock.  In some instances this behavior is warranted based on the historical equity 
management strategies observed.  In other cases, this behavior may be perception because 
the accurate financial information is required for an economic analysis.  Allocating equity 
credits to members rather than cash can reduce the perceived benefits of doing business 
with the cooperative.  A major challenge for many boards is to develop consistent plan 
for retiring over invested members’ equity thus creating equity value for members/users 
while maintaining the economic viability of the firm.   
Cooperatives seeking to grow, acquire new technologies, offer new services, or 
pursue strategic alliances or joint ventures need access to capital.  How does a 
cooperative maintain it's competitive position, controll the balance sheet and return on 
investment for future growth while maintaining ownership in line with use? Research 
directed toward determining the optimal capital structure for agricultural cooperatives 
could provide solutions to debt-related financial stress problems (Moller, Featherstone, 
and Barton, 1996).  Assessing the cooperatives' member needs, proper capitalization, and 
economies of scale are among the critical areas that need attention (Torgerson, 1992). 
The overall goal of this research is to identify alternative capitalization strategies 
that enhance the farmer-owned agricultural cooperative’s control of their capital structure 
and return on investment while maintaining the user-owner balance in a way that 
provides an acceptable level of financial risk.  The methodology proposed here will 
model dynamically the asset capitalization of agricultural cooperatives with the ultimate 
goal of providing guidelines that helps reduce the cooperatives financial stress and 
adequately addresses the member-owner’s needs.  Specifically, this research will explore 
alternative capital management strategies for farmer-owned cooperatives.  The most 
important contributions of this research are: 
  3 
•  Evaluation of the impacts of alternative capital management strategies in terms of the 
cooperative’s control over capitalization of assets, competitiveness, and the returns to the 
individual farmer-owners in an uncertain economic and financial environment. 
•  Introduction of risk to provide a more probabilistic picture of the financial decisions 
made by cooperative management teams. 
•  Recognizing the relationship between cash patronage, the value of cooperative equity, 
and the impact on future products or service demand.  
The next section of the paper describes the methodology used to link the financial 
activity of the cooperative to demand for future products and services by members.  The 
third section describes preliminary results from application of the model to the case of a 
West Texas cooperative.  The results first focus on comparing the results from including 
members’ response versus without including them. The final section will focus on the 
financial and economic impacts of four alternative capital management strategies for the 
West Texas cooperative. 
 
2  Method of Analysis 
 
A dynamic stochastic simulation framework was design to replicate the financial 
activity and risk facing a farmer owned cooperative.  Simulation is a powerful 
methodology that mimics an economic system and allows for better understanding of the 
behavior of complex systems.  Stochastic simulation is an even more powerful analytical 
tool since it allows incorporation of risk analysis.  A stochastic simulation model can 
assist in understanding the risk consequences of different business strategies. 
Simulation has been used in the past on several occasions and proved to be a 
useful tool to study cooperatives’ investment, strategic management decisions, and equity 
management.  Some previous research using simulation to study cooperatives’ financial 
and strategic decisions are Bejerlein, (1977), Bejerlein and Schroeder, (1978), Gray 
(1998), Poray (1997), Laughlin (1999), and Barton et al (1995).  All of this previous 
work has made important contributions but has failed to capture the complexity of the 
unique dynamic nature of the interaction between cooperatives and their patron-members.  
The importance of the dynamics of the cooperative and patron-members relationship was  4 
well stated by Schmiesing in Cobia 1988, “The cooperative initiates a pricing and 
patronage refund policy to achieve a specific cooperative objective and the patrons 
respond to the implementation of the firm’s strategy.  Whether a specific cooperative 
objective will actually be achieved depends on the response of patrons.” 
The model proposed here builds on FRAN (Financial Risk Analyzer), a firm level 
stochastic model developed at Texas A&M (Gray, 1998).  A members’ simulation 
component is added to the stochastic simulation model of FRAN.  FRAN can handle a 
large number of sales, business and financial variables.  The model provides several 
detailed pro-forma financial statements and statistics over a predetermined planning 
horizon.  The model was designed to provide results in a regular business-accounting 
form so the results can be used to easily interact with management and the board of 
directors.  However, as mentioned above, the model does not consider members’ demand 
responses to cooperative strategies. 
The member behavior addition reflects what changes in income affect patronage, 
which in turn affects willingness to do business with the cooperative, which influences 
future volume and future income.  The most important difference between a model that 
does not consider members’ responses and a model that does is in the growth rate in 
volume.  In the case where the model contains no member response, the growth rate is 
exogenous to the model.  In the case where the model incorporates member responses, 
the growth rate is equal to the exogenously projected adjusted endogenously for member 
patronage behavior.  Members’ responses are a function of their own price elasticity, cash 
patronage refunds, equity credits refunds, valuation of equity credit refunds, expectations 
of future cash and equity credits refunds, transaction price, cross price elasticity and 
competitor’s price response.  Figure 1 shows a simplified diagram of the model and the 


























Figure 1: Members’ Response Model Diagram 
 
The derivation of the members response model starts with the regular demand 
function where changes in volume demanded depend on changes in net own price 
charged by the cooperative, own price elasticity, changes in price charged by competition 
and a cross price elasticity.   
 
IOF P Pnet E Q ∆ + ∆ = ∆ % ] [ % % δ ε  (1) 
 
Where: 
%∆ Q    percentage change in volume demanded from year t-1 to year t 
%∆ P  net  percentage change in the net price members pay for the cooperative’s 
goods and services from year t-1 to year t 
%∆  P IOF  percentage change in the net price members pay to investor owned firms 
for goods and services from year t-1 to year t 
ε     members’ own price demand elasticity 
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The net price charged to cooperative members is the transaction price at the time 
of the exchange of goods and services minus the expected value of the cash and allocated 
equity at the end of the fiscal year.  Since patronage refunds are paid about a year later 
than the transaction, members must estimate the net price charged to them by forming an 
expectation of future patronage (Cobia, 1988).  Equation 2 illustrates the member’s 
formation of a net price (P net).  The expected price consist of the price charged at the 
time of the transaction (P trans) and expected cash patronage (CPR) and equity credit 
values (EC.V.), both of which are discounted by one period to reflect the delay until the 



















− =  (2) 
 
Where 
P net t    the net price paid by the member in year t 
P trans t  the transaction price at the time of the deal between the cooperative and 
the member 
E […]    the expectation operator 
CPR t    cash patronage refund paid to the member at the end of the fiscal year t 
EC.V. t  the value of the patronage refund paid in equity credits to the member at 
the end of the fiscal year t 
r m    member’s discount rate 
 
 












































δ ε  (3) 
 
The expectation operator is a weighted average of past cash and equity credits 
patronage refunds.  Equations 4 and 5 illustrate the expectations formulations for cash 
patronage and equity credits value.  Each variable’s expectation is formed by a weighted 
average of up to the previous 10 years CPR and allocated equity.  Managers, boards,  7 
and/or members could determine the weights.  In summary, equations 4 and 5 indicate 
that a members’ expectation for cash patronage and allocated equity credits received at 
the end of the fiscal year are formed based on the historical performance of the 

















i t i t t ECV w ECV E  (5) 
 
The next problem in developing a members’ response model is determining the 
value members assign to allocated equity credits.  Economic theory and corporate finance 
theory brings some useful concepts and ideas.  An allocated equity credit from a 
cooperative is a financial asset similar to a corporate stock.  The fundamental theory of 
economic value says that the value of an economic good is the net present value of future 
returns from that good.  Following the same principle, finance theory says the value of 
stocks is the net present value of future cash flows to the owners of stocks.  The value of 
a stock is the expected dividends to be paid in perpetuity discounted to present.   























=   (6) 
 
where 
VS 0   the value of the stock at time t=0 
DPS 1  expected dividends per share at t=1 
Re  stockholder discount rate 
g  expected dividends growth rate 
EPS 1  expected earnings per share at t=1 
RR  retention ratio (retained earnings per share / earnings per share) 
BVS  book value of stock  8 
ROE  return on equity 
 
Dividends per share is just earnings per share minus the retained earnings per 
share that are retained for future investments.  Earnings per share depend on the book 
value of the equity and the ROE of the firm. The more efficiently managers use the assets 
of the firm and control the capital structure of the firm, the higher the ROE and therefore 
the higher the earnings per share and the dividends per share that stockholders will 
receive.  
Assuming that the corporation is not being poorly administrated, the only source 
of growth in dividends is the additional investments made by the corporation with 
retained earnings and the ROE of those investments.  This is the reason why many firm 
stock values increase when their dividends are low or non-existent. The stockholders 
have a high expectation on the additional investments and their ROE and as a 
consequence the expected dividend growth is high, increasing the value of the stock in 
equation 6.
1 
The same valuation principles could be used to determine the value of cooperative 
equity credits.  The value of equity credits is just the net present value of cash flows that 
members will receive from those equity credits.  One difference between cooperative 
equity and corporate equity is that a profitable cooperative is expected to redeem the 
equity back to members when no larger needed and based in  use.  Thus, one of the cash 
flows members will receive from owning equity credits is the book value of the equity 
credit at the time the cooperative decides to redeem equity.  However, this is not the total 
cash flow that members will receive from the equity credits.  The cooperative is giving 
equity credits to members because the cooperative is retaining earnings for investment.  
As long as the management team invests in profitable projects and manages them 
successfully those investments will generate additional earnings to the cooperative.  For 
example, a grain marketing cooperative that decides to invest in infrastructure to handle 
specialty crops may be able to pay additional cash patronage, dividends, and/or allocated 
                                                 
1 For a more detailed discussion of stock valuation the reader can consult any of the following books, Ross, 
Westerfield and Jaffe, “ Corporate Finance” Sixth Edition, McGraw-Hill 1998; Palepu, Healy and Bernard, 
“Business Analysis and Valuation” Second Edition, South-Western 2000; or one of the classics Williams, 
John Burr, “The Theory of Investment Value”, Fraser Publishing, 1997.  9 
equity credits to members from the incremental earnings coming from the new business.  
Therefore, it is necessary to include the valuation of equity credits the cash flows from 
additional cash patronage and dividends that members expect to receive as a consequence 
of the cooperatives additional investments.   
The valuation of equity credits is a function of the expected incremental value of 
cash patronage and dividends plus the discounted book value of equity.  Equation 6 
summarizes this relationship for an individual member. 
 




































=  (7) 
Where 
Div    total dividends paid to member I at the end of fiscal year t 
ECBV   the book value of equity credits paid to member i  
E [T]    the expected time horizon for equity redemption 
r i     member i discount rate 
 
The expectation of T is formed based on the weighted average age of equity over 









i t i t t T w T E  (8) 
 
The total cash patronage paid to members is a portion of total profits. The portion of total 
profits that the management team pays to patrons is called the cash patronage payout 
ratio.   The total amount of cash patronage is distributed among patrons according to their 
share of total business.  Therefore, the cash patronage received by a single member is a 
function of net profit, the cash patronage payout ratio and the member’s share of total 
patronage.  Net profit is a function of total equity and how efficiently managers use that 
equity, usually measured by the return on equity.  By multiplying the book value of 
equity credits by the cooperative’s ROE, the expected incremental net profit produced by 
that equity credit can be obtained.  Multiplying the incremental net profit by the cash 
patronage payout ratio and the individual members share of total future business done, 
yields the individual members expected incremental cash patronage refunds in future  10 
years generated from this year’s allocated equity credits.  Thus, the expected incremental 
cash patronage refund at any time for any member is: 
t i t i t t i s cr ECBV ROE E CPR E , , ] [ ] [ =  (9) 
 
Where 
E [ROE t]   is the cooperative’s expected return on equity at year t 
cr t     is the cash patronage payout ratio at year t 
s i,t     the share of business of member i year t 
 
Following the same reasoning the expected dividends to be received if the cooperative 
pays a dividend to their members is 
 
t i t t t w ECBVdr ROE E Div E , ] [ ] [ =  (10) 
 
where 
dr t     is the dividends payout ratio at year t 
w i,t     is the equity share of member i ant year t 
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=  (11) 
The value that members put on the equity credits may be more or less than the 
book value of the equity credits depending on the length of time before the equity is 
redeemed and the amount of expected incremental cash flows associated with the equity 
while it is being used by the cooperative.  The value of incremental cash flows will 
depend on the expected ROE, the cash patronage and dividend payout ratios, and the 
expected time horizon and on the individual member shares of total business and total 
equity.  For example, a year with a very good net profit and high patronage refunds will 
create an increase in the expectation operator and consequently will have a positive 
impact on the growth in volume.  A bad year with a poor patronage refund will have a 
negative impact on member expectations resulting in a negative impact in volume 
growth.  11 
High and low net incomes not only impact cash patronage expectations, they also 
affect the valuation of allocated equity credits through the expected return on equity 
(ROE).  A low ROE will decrease the expected value of equity credits.  A high ROE will 
increase the value of equity credits.  The return on equity is the best financial indicator 
that members have to measure how good the cooperative has been using members’ 
equity.  At the time the cooperative decides to retain profits to build equity for future 
investments, the success of those investments will determine how well the cooperative 
will serve members in the future and how much profit and patronage refunds the 
cooperative will return to members.  Observations as to how successful the cooperative 
has been in the past are a good predictor of how good the cooperative will be in the 
future.  Members should welcome additional investments in a successful competitively 
price cooperative with a large ROE because they will expect the cooperative to be 
successful and return large patronage refunds in cash and allocated equity credits in the 
future.  As a consequence they will put more confidence on the cooperative investments 
and will give more value to the equity credits they receive from the cooperative. 
Increases in equity redemptions will have a positive impact on the valuation of 
equity credits and therefore a positive impact on growth.  To the contrary, a decrease in 
equity redemptions will negatively impact the valuation of equity credits and therefore 
decrease volume growth. 
If the cooperative needs to increase the retention of profits to make new 
investments (such as, capacity expansions), cash refunds will decline and equity credits 
will increase, the decrease in cash patronage would have a negative impact on the volume 
growth rate.  The effect of the increase in equity credit patronage will depend on the 
valuation of equity credits.  If the cooperative has historical high ROE and a stable equity 
redemption program, the valuation of equity credits will be high and will counterbalance 
to some extent the cash patronage decrease effect.  This would be the case for a 
cooperative with a successful track record, enticing members to stay with the cooperative 
because they expect to benefit from doing business with the cooperative in the future.  To 
the contrary, if the cooperative had a poor ROE and a bad history of equity redemption, 
the valuation will be low and there will be a net negative impact in volume growth.   
  12 
3  Model Application, Assumptions and Scenarios 
The theoretical model described above was calibrated and applied to a West 
Texas Cotton ginning cooperative. The cooperative has a five year average annual 
revenues of $3.7 million.  Ginning services account for 85% of the income and the rest 
comes from associated services such as transportation of cotton seed, compression and 
sampling fees.  The five year average operating profit is $1.7 million and the average net 
profit is $850,000.  The assets of the cooperative, according to year 2000 audited 
financial statements, were $3.6 million, and total equity was $2.5 million.  All equity was 
allocated to members and only 2.5% was nonqualified.  The cooperative is extremely 
efficient in the use of its assets and equity with a five year average net margin of 22%, 
average return on assets of 21%, and a five year average return on equity of 41%.   
Cotton ginning is a risky business given the weather characteristics of West 
Texas.  The average number of bales ginned over the last 5 years was 35,480 bales with a 
coefficient of variation (C.V.) of 30%. Ginning costs are more stable given the large 
proportion of fixed costs.  As a consequence, net profit is extremely volatile showing a 
C.V. of 52%. 
The profit allocation policy followed by the cooperative is to return a minimum 
46% as cash to patrons. In the past the cooperative has been able to pay an average of 
50% of profits back to members in cash.  Remaining earnings have been used to increase 
investment and to rotate members’ equity allowing payments to old equity.  The oldest 
equity is 9 years.  All the retained earnings are allocated as qualified to reduce the tax 
burden of the cooperative. The board policy is to use debt only to finance fixed asset 
acquisitions.  The cooperative does not use debt to retire aged equity or to manage the 
capital structure (debt to equity relationship). 
The cooperative is expected to gin 40,000 bales in the first year of the simulation.  
Expected volume is assumed to increase at 2% per year, before any member responses 
are taken into account.  Average weight per bale, at 494 pounds, is assumed constant 
throughout the simulation period.  Burr extracted cotton is assumed to be 60% of the first 
year’s volume, increasing 5 percent each year up to a maximum of 80% of total volume.  
Motes are sold for $0.12 per lb in each year of the planning horizon.  All the cottonseed 
sales to PYCO, the main regional cooperative affiliate, are retuned to members.  Per unit  13 
fees for ginning are $2.10/cwt of field cotton the first year and increased $0.10 every two 
years.  In addition, fees are generated from the following: compression at $8.25/bale, 
agent fees at $1.25/bale, marketing association at $1.38/bale, sampling at $1.50/bale, 
truck income at $5.00/ton.  The cooperative is starting with $200,000 of working capital 
the first year.   
In addition to these variables it was necessary to determine the own price, cross 
price elasticities, and the response of competitors to changes in the cooperative 
transaction prices.  Ideally these parameters should be determined using a survey on 
members.  However, this methodology is beyond the scope of this research.  Parameter 
values were obtained by eliciting survey responses from the management team.   
According to the management team, the own price elasticity is –0.5, and the cross price 
elasticity is –0.5.  In addition, the management team indicated that competitors would 
immediately replicate any changes in transaction price made by the cooperative.  
The historical information and parameters described above were used to calibrate 
the model and obtain the results described in the next section.  The results section has two 
parts. The first part compares the results of the FRAN dynamic simulation model, 
without members’ response, to results when the members’ response is incorporated.  The 
second part uses the simulation model with member responses to compare the current 
profit allocation and equity redemption strategy for the cooperative with 3 alternatives 
polices.  The objective of the scenario analysis is to evaluate the consequences of 
alternative empirical management strategies for the cooperative and its members. 
 
4.1  Comparing Model Results without Members’ Responses to that with 
Members’ Responses 
 
The purpose of this section is to illustrate the impacts of including member 
responses in the dynamic simulation model.  The results in this section focus on the 
differences in the mean growth rate, volume, and profits for the model.  In addition, this 
section will point out some of the idiosyncrasies of the cooperative situation and how 
these situations impact members’ responses. 
Figure 1 displays the mean results of the 10-year simulation for the cooperative 
with and without member response functions.  Figure 1A illustrates the growth rate of  14 
revenues under both cases.  When no-member responses are incorporated, the 
cooperative growth rate is assumed constant at 2% per year.  This constant growth rate is 
also reflected in the actual volume of cotton ginned where the volume grows linearly 
from 40,000 bales in year 1 to almost 48,000 bales by the 10
th year.  Net savings also 
grow over the 10 year period from an average $800,000 in year 1 to an average 
$1,550,000 by year 10 (Figure 1C).  A Significant increase in the growth of profits 
starting in year 7 is due to a large drop in depreciation expenses that occur that year.  The 
cooperative experienced a substantial fixed capital investment in the ginning operation in 
1994 and that investment is completely depreciated by 2007.  Since the simulation 
assumes a constant capital asset base, meaning that depreciation is immediately 
reinvested in assets, the level of depreciation and thus capital reinvestment drops in 2007 
when the 1994 investment becomes fully depreciated.  This significant increase in 
profitability has a big effect on the results when the member response functions are 
included. 
As discussed in the methodology section, incorporating the member response 
functions requires a computation of the expected volume of cash patronage and the 
volume of expected allocated equity credits.  Figure 1D illustrates these two variables for 
the cooperative.  The large profits enjoyed by the cooperative 3 years prior to this 
simulation due to extraordinary good weather are dropped out of the expectation operator 
for the variables in year 2 of the simulation when this abnormally high profit is taken out 
expectations for cash refunds and value of equity credits decline to more normal values.  
The year to year changes in the expected patronage refunds and the value of equity 
credits determine the members expected patronage refunds and the members expected 
changes in the net price charged for ginning services.  The expected net price of ginning 
coupled with the assumed elasticity of demand result in the growth rate shown on figure 
1A for the simulation model when member responses are incorporated.  The figure shows 
an average 1.25 percent drop in second year volume due to the decline in expectation of 
the membership (the drop in expected cash patronage and value of equity credits from 
year 1 to year 2).  Of course, this leads to the lower volume of profits experienced in year 
in the results of the members’ response model.  The decline in profitability for year 1 and 
2 leads to further decline in expectations for year 3 (Figure 1D).  15 
This dynamic interaction continues for each year of the simulation.  The growth in 
volume continues to be lower until year 7.  In year 7, the effect of the drop in 
depreciation expenses increases profitability and increases members’ expectations of cash 
and values of equity credits.  This increase in expectations increases growth and 
profitability for the future.  This suggests that many potential patrons would rather let 
current members pay for the large investment in 1994. Then they will use the cooperative 
to reap the benefits once the assets are paid for.  This result illustrates the cooperative 
incentive that exists for members to own as little as possible but use alot.   
While figure 1 illustrates the temporal effect of including member response 
functions, table 2 summarize the aggregate net present value effects and the risk 
associated with these aggregate measures.  Since the no member response model does not 
suffer from the negative impact at the beginning of the simulation period the total net 
savings and total cash flows to members are slightly greater than the values in the case of 
the members’ response model.  In addition, the members’ response model present a 
greater C.V. and also more extreme minimum and maximum values than the non-
members’ response model.  Therefore, the members’ response model is behaving as 
Schmiesing predicted.  The response of patrons to the expected net price and not to the 
transaction price and the uncertainty in several variables that affect the cooperative’s 
profits introduce an interesting interaction mechanism that creates instability in the 
system (Cobia, 1988).   
Thus, this set of results illustrates the effect of including members’ response 
function in the dynamics of the simulation model.  By including these functions, the 
dynamic simulation model can do a better estimation of the impacts of alternative capital 
management strategies under risk.  The next section will examine three such alternatives. 
 
4.2  Evaluating Alternative Capital Management Strategies 
 
This section describes the results of the simulation of the current cooperative 
policy (scenario 1) and 3 alternative policies. Table one shows the different profit 
allocation and equity redemption strategies analyzed.  In the first scenario, the 
cooperative returns 46 percent of current year patronage in cash to members and then  16 
uses remaining cash to retire equity, in a revolving equity plan, with the goal of achieving 
five year old equity; the cooperative currently has eleven year old equity.  If additional 
cash is remaining after reaching five year equity target, the remaining cash is used to 
increase cash patronage above the initial cash patronage level of 46%.  Under this base 
scenario, the cooperative does not use debt financing to achieve its desired equity age of 
5 years (the model does, however, assume that debt financing is used to acquire new 
assets at 50% of the asset value, and debt financing is used to cover any cash flow deficits 
from business loss).  Table 1 summarizes the main assumption of the 4 scenarios. 
 
Table 1: Assumptions for the Different Scenarios 
  Scenario 1  Scenario 2  Scenario 3  Scenario 4 
Cash  Patronage  46% 20% 75% 46% 
Target  Oldest  Equity  5 5 5 5 
Use debt to pay equity?  No  No  No  Yes 
 
4.2.1 Scenario 2: Focusing on Equity Redemption 
 
Scenario 2 focuses on equity redemption first. Instead of paying 46% of profits in 
cash, it pays the 20% minimum cash payment required to qualify the allocation.  The 
remaining profits are used to maintain working capital and retire equity, thus reducing the 
age of the oldest equity to the desired Board target of 5 years.  Debt is not used to retire 
equities in scenario 2.   
Figure 2 illustrates the impacts of reducing cash patronage and increasing equity 
redemptions.  Figure 2A shows this changes in policy affects the member expectation of 
cash patronage immediately and those expectations remain lower than the base scenario 
through out the ten year simulation period.  This lower expectation for cash patronage 
will have a significant negative impact on volume growth for the cooperative of minus 
4% during the fist year.  However, the focus of this strategy is to reduce the age of the 
oldest equity thereby increasing the present value of equity credits.  This strategy starts to 
give some results after the 4 year when growth rates get above 2 percent.   
Figure 2B shows that the value of equity credits under this scenario is actually 
lower than under the base scenario. While using cash to pay old equities sooner reduces 
the expected time that the cooperative will keep members’ equity (and thus, lowers the 
discount effect on book value of the equity credits) the increase in the value of the book  17 
credits themselves is not enough to offset the loss in expected incremental cash flows 
associated with reduced cash patronage.  Since the expected cash patronage declined as 
have in figure 2A, the incremental cash flow associated with the equity credits also 
declines. 
The lower expectations for cash patronage and value of equity credits have a very 
large negative impact on growth in sales in years 2 and 3 because there are large amounts 
of aged equity and align age of equity to the target of five years requires large amount of 
funds.  In the fifth year the amounts of aged equity is significantly less than in the 
previous years, this allows to increase the funds available for cash patronage payments.  
Starting in year 6, net profits increase because of the reduction in depreciations already 
explained, the value of equity of equity credits begins to rise rapidly, which increases 
members expectations of future returns and motivates a large use of the cooperative 
spurring growth. 
The loss of volume growth in the first few years of scenario 2 significantly 
lowered the overall volume for the cooperative.  The lower volumes lead directly to the 
reduced profitability shown in figure 2D.  Thus, it appears that for the cooperative to 
focus almost entirely on equity retirements would be detrimental to large term 
profitability.  In fact, table 3 shows the present value of net savings to be $438,000 lower 
than under the base scenario.  While scenario 2 was able to lower the age of the oldest 
equity from 11 years the first year to 6 by the last year and decrease the average oldest 
equity by 1.5 years compared with scenario 1 average (table 3), the total present value of 
cash distributions to members dropped $463,000 because of the reduced profitability 
specially during the first 5 years. 
 
4.2.2 Scenario 3: Focusing on Cash Patronage 
 
Scenario 3 gives more emphasis to cash refunds than scenario 1.  Scenario 3 pays 
75% of net profits in cash refunds back to members leaving fewer funds available to 
retire mature equities.   
Figure 3 illustrates the impacts of increasing cash patronage from current levels. 
Expected cash patronage in each year is about $5/bale much higher than the base scenario 
(figure 3A).  The value of equity credits is about $2.5/bale lower than the base scenario.   18 
Since the amount of equity credits being issued has dropped from the standard 54% in the 
base scenario to 25% under scenario 3 the result is less cash available for equity 
redemptions and increases the age of oldest equity by almost 3 years from 8 to 11.4 (table 
3).  The older equity increases the expected time before the equity credits issued are 
redeemed, which further reduces the value of equity credits.  However, the incremental 
cash flow from the equity credits are expected to be quite high since the cash patronage 
ratio is set at 75 percent.  Thus, some of the reduction in the value of equity credits is 
offset by the higher expected cash flows.   
The higher expected cash patronage in the current period more than offsets any 
drop in the value of equity credits under scenario 3.  Thus, the growth rate under scenario 
3 is 1 percent to 0.5 percent higher than the base scenario, particularly in the earlier years 
as patrons react to the large increase in cash patronage relative to history.  Of course, the 
higher growth rate leads to more volume, which leads to higher net savings (figure 2D 
and table 3).  In fact, scenario 3 has the highest present value of net savings for the 
cooperative and the highest present value of cash patronage to members despite the fact 
that equity redemptions are much lower than in scenario 1.  This illustrates how an 
aggressive cash patronage policy favors current patrons over past patrons.  The scenario 
may overstate the benefits of increased cash patronage if the cooperative has an effective 
capacity constraint.  By paying 75 percent in cash patronage the cooperative is left with 
very little equity to grow the asset base.  If the revenue growth created by the increased 
cash patronage were more than the capacity of the current assets then the strategy of 
increasing cash patronage would be less effective. 
 
4.2.3 Scenario 4: Using Debt to Pay Overdue Equities while Maintaining Large Cash 
Refunds 
 
Scenario 4 is the same as base scenario 1 except for the debt policy.  Scenario 4 
allows using debt to pay equities older than 5 years.  Under all scenarios the cooperative 
also has a requirement that equity will not fall bellow $50/bale.   
Figure 4 illustrates the effect of allowing debt to pay over due equity and change 
the debt to equity ratio or capital structure of the cooperative. Since scenario 4 presents 
the same cash patronage payout ratio as the base scenario, 46%, the members’  19 
expectation of cash patronage refund is very similar in both scenarios (figure 4A).  The 
use of debt does not alter the cash patronage refunds but is does modify the valuation of 
equity credits compared with scenario 1.  The use of debt at the beginning of the 
simulation period produces an increase in equity redemptions and reduces the time 
horizon for which equity credits book value are discounted compared to scenario 1 (table 
3). As a consequence the expected value of equity credits is increased.  This increase in 
expectations is particularly significant in the beginning of the simulation when there are 
large amounts of aged equity that is retired strengthening the use of debt capital (figure 
4B).  The increase in expected present value of equity credits produces a jump in the 
volume growth rate of scenario 4 at the beginning of the simulation as shown in figure 
4C.  The higher growth rates in volume, attained thanks to the use of debt, allow scenario 
4 to present a larger volume of sales at the beginning than the base scenario. However, 
after the initial increase in equity payments and the consequent increase in members’ 
expectations and growth, member do not receive any other equity payment or cash 
patronage payment substantially different from the base scenario, therefore, the behavior 
of both scenarios becomes pretty similar for the rest of the simulation. 
Even considering that scenario 4 policy has a better response from members at the 
beginning of the simulation than the base scenario and that those better responses allows 
scenario 4 to increase volume more than scenario 1, the net profits of scenario 4 are 
slightly lower than net profits in the base scenario through out the period of analysis.  
This is the result of higher interest payments that have to be paid and that reduces the 
future net profits of the cooperative.   
Scenario 4 allows the second greatest net present value of total benefits to 
members since the use of debt allows increasing equity redemption cash flows to 
members and as a result it increases the net present value of total cash flows returned to 
members.   
Comparing the NPV of net profits none of the presents stochastic dominance over 
the other scenarios. However, when comparing the NPV of cash flows to members, 
scenarios 3 and 4 1first order stochastically dominates the others. 
  20 
5 Conclusions 
 
The previous studies that have used simulation have failed to taken into 
consideration demand responses to cooperative capital strategies.  The methodology 
proposed here follows from the theoretical work done by Schmiesing and Cobia and uses 
regular demand and finance theory to fill the deficiencies of previous cooperative 
simulation models. 
As demonstrated by the results, a simulation model that ignores members 
response could overestimate revenues and profits in cases where cash patronage or 
profitability decreases or could underestimate sales and net profits when cash refunds and 
profitability is increased making equity credits more valuable.  It is also important to 
notice that a model that ignores member potential response will underestimate the 
volatility of the performance variables and therefore underestimate the real risk that 
cooperatives face. 
When members’ response is incorporated, the results suggest that increasing cash 
patronage seems to be preferred to increasing equity redemptions according to the growth 
rates obtained comparing scenario 3 (75% cash refund and equity rotation of 12 years) to 
scenario 2 (20% cash refund and equity rotation of 8 years).   
The use of debt to increase equity redemptions seams to be a good strategy for 
members, especially in circumstances where the cooperative has a low debt to equity 
ratio as in the case for this West Texas cooperative.  However, these benefits could 
diminish in the long run as interest payments increase and the net profits are reduced.   
The particular cooperative used for this study has a large unutilized capacity and 
large fixed costs.  Therefore, any strategy that significantly increases volume improves 
the asset turnover ratio and has a significant positive cash flow impact that offsets the 
increased cash out flows.  This explains some of the benefits of scenarios 3 and 4 over the 
base situation.  Further examples are needed to test how well strategies 3 and 4 would 
work when the cooperative was operating at full capacity.  In this case additional sales 
would require additional investments in assets to handle the increased sales.  Otherwise 
the cash distributions to the membership would result in increases in demand for the 
cooperative’s services but no capacity to meet that demand, which would then reduce the 
benefits of increased cash to the membership.  21 
This reports assumes that current members will also operate in the future. It does 
not incorporate the results of members operating in different phases of the production 
horizon.  In the future the model of members should be expanded to allow multiple type 
of members responses.  Different members with different balance of equities and use, tax 
brackets, individual growth rates and discount rates will value equity credits differently 
and the aggregate results of the different responses could be different from the all 
members response simulated in this research.  22 
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 Figures 1: Selected Variables to Show Differences between Non-members Response and Member Response 
Model 
 

















Figure 1B: Cotton Bales 
 

















Figure 1D: Total Expected Cash Refund and Value of 
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Table 2: Total Net Income and Total Cash Flows to Members 
 








PV of Total 
Cash Flows 
         
No Members' Reactions 
Mean 5,266,257 7.8  2,662,048  2,221,134  4,883,181 
Std Dev  937,855  1.3  589,829  362,155  890,364 
CV 18  16.7  22  16  18 
Min 2,234,432  5.8  1,375,241  853,929  2,229,170 
Max 7,697,569  16.3  4,338,785  2,910,054  7,248,839 
         
Members' Reaction 
Mean 5,137,251 8.0  2,680,492  2,093,326  4,773,818 
Std Dev  1,549,391  1.3  1,052,371  474,962  1,446,530 
CV 30  16.1  39  23  30 
Min 924,920  5.8  603,993  539,150  1,143,142 
Max 10,011,145  12.2  6,451,742  2,966,415  9,418,156 
 
 
 Figures 2: Selected Variables to Show Differences between Scenario 1 and Scenario 2 
 


















Figure 2B: Expected Members’ Value of Equity Credits 
Refund 
 










































































Mean S1 Mean S2Figures 3: Selected Variables to Show Differences between Scenario 1 and Scenario 3 
 

















Figure 3B: Expected Members’ Value of Equity Credits 
Refund 
 





































































Mean S1 Mean S3Figures 4: Selected Variables to Show Differences between Scenario 1 and Scenario 4 
 

















Figure 4B: Expected Members’ Value of Equity Credits 
Refund 
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Table 3: Total Net Income and Total Benefits to Members 
 




 PV Cash 
Patronage 
 PV Equity 
Redemptions 
 PV of Total 
Cash Flows 
         
 Scenario 1 
Mean 5,137,251 8.0  2,680,492  2,093,326  4,773,818 
Std Dev  1,549,391 1.3  1,052,371  474,962  1,446,530 
CV 30 16.1  39  23  30 
Min 924,920 5.8  603,993  539,150  1,143,142 
Max 10,011,145 12.2  6,451,742  2,966,415  9,418,156 
         
Scenario 2 
Mean 4,674,642 6.8  1,878,215  2,468,269  4,346,484 
Std Dev  1,480,587 1.2  1,070,439  432,381  1,382,151 
CV 32 17.6  57  18  32 
Min 852,066 5.2  254,663  840,618  1,095,281 
Max 9,487,316 11.5  5,815,552  3,109,677  8,925,229 
         
Scenario 3 
Mean 5,487,879 11.4  4,160,540  951,004  5,111,544 
Std Dev  1,653,510 1.2  1,269,812  275,701  1,536,863 
CV 30 10.7  31  29  30 
Min 971,565 8.8  1,002,622  190,000  1,192,622 
Max 10,490,370 17.7  8,235,267  1,613,426  9,848,693 
         
Scenario 4 
Mean 5,136,492 8.8  2,825,457  2,182,790  5,008,246 
Std Dev  1,567,740 2.9  1,081,817  431,614  1,425,301 
CV 31 33.1  38  20  28 
Min 832,461 5.4  587,987  816,916  1,480,018 
Max 9,979,509 20.3  6,620,268  2,898,828  9,519,097 
 
 